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CASES NOTED
INSURANCE - ATTEMPT TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY BY WILL
Insured, after learning of a pending divorce suit by his wife, made a will
leaving the proceeds of two insurance policies, in which the wife was desig-
nated as beneficiary, to his grandmother. After insured's death the ex-wife
instituted a declaratory judgment suit to determine her rights under the
policies. Held, where not expressly or impliedly authorized by the policy, a
change of beneficiary by will cannot operate to destroy the right of the bene-
ficiary designated in the policy. The designated beneficiary's right had vested
upon death before the will became effective. Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio
St. 599, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951).
Under earlier insurance policies without the reserved power to change
the beneficiary, the right to the proceeds vested absolutely on issuance1 and
was in the nature of a property right,2 which could only be divested by acts'
or defaults4 provided in the policy itself. Most modem policies reserve to
the insured the power to change the beneficiary without the designated bene-
ficiary's consent. Under these, some courts hold the beneficiary's right to
the proceeds before the insured's death is a mere expectancy; 5 others consider
it a conditional,6 contingent, 7 qualified vested,8 or vested right subject to
defeasance;1 but all agree' 0 that the right is vested absolutely upon death of
the insured. The weight of authority is that substantial compliance with
the specified mode of change of beneficiary (doing everything reasonably
within one's power to effect a change) is sufficient, although a few' 2 still
require strict compliance. The general rle is that an attempt to change a
beneficiary by will is'not effective,"8 but a strong minority favors the contrary
1. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Halpern, 47 F.2d 935 (D.C. Pa. 1931); Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1915). Contra: Estate of
Breitung, 78 Wis. 33 (1890); Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 223 (1860); Wis. STAT. § 246.09
(adopts vested right doctrine only when beneficiary is a married woman); see Oldenburg
v. Central State Assur. Soc., 243 Wis. 8, 9 N.W.2d 133 (1943).
2. MeManus v. Peerless Casualty Co., 114 Me. 98, 95 At. 510 (1915).
3. Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920)
(surrender of policy by insured).
4. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 178 U.S. 347 (1900) (failure to pay premiums).
5. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, supra note 3; Davis v. Modem Industrial
Bank, 279 N. Y. 405, 18 N.E.2d 639 (1939).
6. Landrum v. Landrum, 186 Ky. 775, 218 S.W. 274 (1920).
7. Morgan v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1938).
8. United States v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 56 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Conn. 1942).
9. Wagner v. Thieriot, 236 N.Y. 588, 142 N.E. 295 (1923).
10. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 131 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1942); Cook v. Cook,
17 Cal.2d 639, 111 P.2d 322 (1941); Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, II N.W.2d
1 (1943).
11. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, 145 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 849 (1945); Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W.2d 480 (1941).
12. Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co., 138 Fla. 443, 189 So. 412 (1929); Second Nat.
Bank v. Dunn, 84 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, Dunn v.
Second.Nat. Bank, 131 Tex. 198, 113 S.W.2d 165 (1938).
13. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 307 II1. App. 652, 30 N.E.2d 937 (1940)
(the only way to change beneficiary was to follow the exclusive steps set out in the policy);
Dogariu v. Dogariu, supra note 12 (must be substantial compliance with steps required
by policy); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E.2d 614 (1942) (a residuary
clause, "share and share alike to V and son" was held to express a future intent);
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view where there is a close proximity between death and the will, so as to
express a present intention. 4
Some courts feel that the effect of interpleader by the company is to
waive strict compliance 15 while others hold that being vested, the right
of the beneficiary can never be waived after death." The effect of divorce
on a beneficiary's right is regulated by statute in some states, 7 but the
general rule is that it will not operate to divest the divorced spouse's in-
terest in the policy.'8
The court in the instant case relied heavily on the public policy doc-
trine promulgated in XVannamaker v. Stroman, 9 that insurers be encouraged
to pay as soon as possible, reasoning that otherwise few companies would
risk the possibility of a contest by the beneficiary of a will. Because of
this possibility of a future claim the companies would tend to wait out
the statutory period or to seek judicial disposition of the proceeds. The
majority held that the power to change was a personal one and must be
exercised during insured's lifetime. In a well-reasoned opinion the dissent
tried to show that the insured did all he could reasonably have done under
the circumstances, 20 but did not rebut the majority's contention that the
will did not become effective until death. The cases mainly relied on held
that the insured's intent was a present one, because at the time of making
the will the insured knew death was near.2' Such was not the case here
as insured had ample time to notify the company.
Wannamaker v. Stroman, 166 S.E. 621 (1932) (it is in the best public interest that
companies pay as soon as possible and few companeis would run the risk of a probated
will); Parks Ex'rs v. Parks, sUra note 11 (a will is presumed to manifest future intent
and is not effective until death).
14. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 67 F. Supp. 159 (D.C. Mo. 1946)
(a letter by a soldier who was killed was held valid as a soldier's will); Pedron v. Olds,
193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.Zd 70 (1937) (will was last expression of intent and as right
under policy and right under will vested at same time, last expression should control);
Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193 Ark. 1155, 104 S.W.2d 814 (1937) (I-I and W were injured
in an accident, H, on notification of W's death, executed a will and died two hours
later; his present intention was effective); Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P.2d
973 (1948) (postcards by a prisoner of war were held to be sufficient as he did all he
possibly could to express his intent); Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 256, 151 Pac. 912
(1927) (holographic will of person with tuberculosis who knew death was close was
sufficient present intention).
15. Arringon v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 21 F.2d 914
(5th Cir. 1927); Glen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 Ohio App. 452, 56 N.E.2d 951 (1943).
16. McDonald v. McDonald, 212 Ala. 137, 102 So. 38 (1924); Acacia Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Mass. 246, 61 N.E.2d 122 (1945).
17. MICH. STAT. ANN., § 25.131 (Cum. Supp. 1946); MINN. STAT. ANN., § 61.15;
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN,, § 5850 (1939); N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Ac'r. § 1160 (1924).
18. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, supra note 10. Contra: Hatch v. Hatch, 35
Tex. Civ. App. 373, 80 S.W. 411 (1904).
19. Sup ra note 13 (attempt to leave proceeds by will did not give company suffi-
cient notice to effect change).
20. Arnold v. Newcomb, 164 Ohio St. 578, 136 N.E. 206 (1922) (signing before
a notary public sufficient); Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109,
150 N.E. 748 (1926) (failure to sign endorsement after notifying company was still
substantial compliance).
21. Arrington v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 15;
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co, v. Cummings, supra note 14; Finnerty v. Cook, supra
note 14.
CASES NOTED
The present decision seems sound since the insured had ample op-
portunity to follow the mode of the policies to substitute his beneficiary.
It also seems indicative of a trend back toward requiring a closer ad-
herence to the steps outlined by the policy to effect the substitution.
TAXATION-ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BASED
ON TAXPAYER'S RELIANCE UPON COMMISSIONER'S
RULINGS
Petitioner filed no gift tax return in 1938 relying on the "acquiescence"'
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that no duty to file existed. This
view was subsequently reaffirmed by the Commissioner's representative in
1941. In 1948, the petitioner's executor was apprised of a deficiency and
penalty for the calendar year 1938. Held, the Tax Court's ruling that the
estate was liable is reversed. The Commissioner is barred from assessing
this tax and penalty. Stockstrorn v. Cornm'r of Internal Revenue, 190 F.2d
283 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
The general rule is that the government is not bound by the statements,2
acts3 and erroneous regulations of its agents, 4 nor can their neglect or ac-
quiescence commit it to an erroneous interpretation of the law.5 A tax-
payer's claim of estoppel against the state" is most often denied by a finding
of an absence of authority in its agents7 or a lack of an essential element of
estoppel.8 The reluctance of the courts to allow estoppel against the gov-
ernment has been particularly notable in the collection and assessment
of revenues. Although estoppel has been invoked more frequently against
1. "The expression simply means the Commissioner does not intend to seek furtherjudicial review and is adopting the ruling as a precedent he will follow in other cases.
Thus taxpayers are assured they can rely upon it without danger of being forced to litigate
the same question in their own cases." Strockstrom v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 283 (note 1)
(D. C. Cir. 1951).
2. Searles Real Estate Trust v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 1115 (1932); James Couzens,
11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
3. Niewaidomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
850 (1947); Wells v. Long, 68 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Idaho 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 842
(9th Cir. 1947).
4. See Schaefer v. Helvering, 83 F.2d 317, 320, aff'd, 299 U.S. 171 (1936); 10A
MERTON, LAw Or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60.14 (Rev. ed. 1948).
5. Schafer v. Helvering, supra note 4.
6. It is essential to distinguish whether it is the government or the taxpayer who
assets estoppel since different rules apply. See Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax
Cases. 3 TAx L. REv. 71 (1947).
7. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940); Ritter v. United States 28 F.2d
265 (3d Cir. 1928).
8. Century Electric Co. v. United States, 75 F.2d 589 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U. S. 766 (1935) (taxpayer not misled); fames Couzens, supra note 2 (no reliance) see
10A MERTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 60.13; Jones, Estoppel in Tax Litigation, 26 GEo.
L. 1. 868, at 871 (1938).
9. Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. Neb. 1944);
Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32 (U. S. 1873); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810).
